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Portugal, Germany and most other countries in Europe-to say
nothing of the Isle of lan (Lex Scripta of the Isle of Man 70,
75), Guernsey, Jersey, Lower Canada, Saint Lucia, Trinidad,
Demerara, Berbice, The Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon and the
Mauritius-also in Vermont, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio (Burge
on Foreign Law 101). It becomes, therefore, an important consideration how far such legitimation can be accepted by countries
where the contrary rule prevails, such as England and the other
states of the United States of America.
New York.

HUGH WEIGHTMAN.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

High Court of Justice.

Crown Case8 .Reserved.

THE QUEEN v. WILLSHIRE.
In 1864 the prisoner had married A. In 1868, A. being alive, he had married
B., and had been convicted of bigamy. In 1879 he married C., and in 1880, C.
being alive, he married D., and was now convicted of bigamy upon an indictment
charging the marriage with D. in the lifetime of C. For the defence the previous
conviction was proved, in order to invalidate the marriage with C., by raising the
presumption that A. was still alive in 1879, no evidence being given as to her
death. The judge at the trial ruled that it lay on the prisoner to prove that A. was
still alive. Hdd, that this ruling was wrong, and the conviction could not therefore
be sustained.

THE prisoner was tried before the Common Serjeant (Sir W. T.
Charley, Q. C.) at the session of the Central Criminal Court held
on the 31st of January last.
The indictment charged that he married Charlotte Georgina
Layers on the 7th of September 1879, and that he feloniously
marriea Edith Maria Miller on the 23d of September 1880, his
wife Charlotte Georgina being then alive. The indictment also
charged that the prisoner had been previously convicted of felony
at the Central Criminal Court in the month of June 1868.
A marriage between the prisoner and Charlotte Georgina Layers
on the 7th of September 1879, and a subsequent marriage between
the prisoner and Edith Maria Miller, on the 23d of September
1880, were clearly proved. It was also proved that at the time
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of the prisoner's marriage to Edith Maria Miller, his alleged wife,
Charlotte Georgina, was alive.
When the case for the prosecution was concluded, the prisoner's
counsel asked the counsel for the prosecution to call a witness
whose name appeared on the indictment, but the counsel for the
prosecution declined to call him. The prisoner's counsel then
himself called the witness, who produced a certificate of the previous conviction of the prisoner for felony in June 1868.
The indictment for this felony and caption were also produced
in court by the proper officer at the instance of the prisoner's
counsel.
The indictment was for bigamy, and alleged that the prisoner
married Ellen Earle on the 31st of March 1864, and feloniously
married Ada Mary Susan Leslie on the 22d of April 1868, his
wife Ellen Earle being then alive.
The prisoner's counsel contended that he had proved that the
prisoner had a wife living in June 1868, and that in order to convict the prisoner on the present indictment it was incumbent on
the prosecution to show that this wife was dead on the 7th of
September 1879, when the prisoner married Charlotte Georgina
Layers.
Counsel fbr the prosecution contended that there being no presumption of law that Ellen Earle was alive on the 7th of September
1879, when the prisoner married Charlotte Georgina Lavers (the
presumption, if any, after seven years being indeed the other way),
and the primafacie case of bigamy having been clearly proved by
the prosecution on the present indictment, the onus was thrown
upon the prisoner of showing that Ellen Earle was alive on the
7th of September 1879, when the prisoner married Charlotte
Georgina Layers.
The Common Seijeant held that the burthen of proof was on
the prisoner.
No evidence was offered by the prisoner's counsel that Ellen
Earle was alive on the 7th of September 1879.
There was no evidence that the alleged marriage of the prisoner
with Ellen Earle was declared void or dissolved by any court of
competent jurisdiction.
The prisoner was found guilty. He was then arraigned on that
part of the indictment which charged the previous conviction of
felony in June 1868, and pleaded guilty. Judgment was respited,
and the prisoner remained in gaol.
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The question reserved for the opinion of the Court foi the Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved was, whether the prisoner had
been properly convicted of feloniously marrying Edith Maria
Miller, his wife Charlotte Georgina being then alive.
IRibton, for the prisoner.-The only legal marriage appearing on
the face of the proceedings is that in 1864. The presumption, if
any, is that this wife is still alive, no evidence of her death being
given. The marriage in 1879 was, therefore, invalid, and this
being the only marriage alleged in the indictment as the foundation
of the offence, the conviction ought not to be affirmed.
Poland and Montagu Williams, for the prosecution.-Prima
facie the marriage of 1879 was a good marriage, and it must be
assumed to be so until the contrary is shown. It was open to the
prisoner to procure evidence on this point, but he did not do so.
[Lord COLERIDGE, C. J.-There is also a presumption that a person once shown to be alive remains alive until the contrary be
shown: Nepean v. Doe, 5 B. & Ad. 86.] The presumption of
law that Ellen Earle was alive in 1879, because proved to have
been alive in 1868, is not sufficient to displace the presumption
that the marriage of 1879 was valid. Moreover, it cannot be said
that there was no evidence of her death, inasmuch as the prisoner
must have stated that he was free to marry in 1879, the prisoner
was the person most likely to know, and, indeed, must be presumed
as against himself to have stated the truth. [Lord COLERIDGE,
C. J.-The Common Serjeant did not leave this question to the
jury as one of conflicting presumptions; he ruled that it lay on
the prisoner to prove that Earle was alive.] In substance it is
submitted that he intended to do so.
Lord COLERIDGE, C. J.-I am of opinion that this conviction

cannot be sustained. There was an undoubtedly valid marriage
proved with Ellen Earle in 1864, and there was some evidence
that she was alive in 1868. Then in 1879 the prisoner contracted
a marriage in facie ecclesie, in respect of which it has been
suggested that we are to assume its validity. The prisoner is
indicted upon the marriage of 1880, and that of 1879 is relied on
to render it illegal. Then the prisoner shows a valid marriage in
1864, and produces evidence that the wife was alive in 1868; thus
setting up a life in 1868 which must be presumed, in the absence
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of any evidence to the contrary, to be continuing in 1879. It is
said that the fact of the marriage in 1879, and the prisoner's
statement that he was then free to marry, raises a presumption of
the truth of that statement sufficient to rebut the presumption
of the continuance of Earle's life. I agree that this is sufficient
to raise a conflict of presumptions which could be left to the jury,
but the Common Serjeant did not so leave it. He ruled that,
besides showing the existence of the life in 1868, further evidence
was necessary, and I am clearly of opinion that he was wrong.
No such proof could be required of the prisoner; it was for the
prosecution to determine the life set up. This ruling being wrong,
and the jury not having had the proper questions submitted to
them, the conviction cannot be sustained.
am of the same opinion. There appears to
LINDLEY, J.-I
have been some evidence both ways upon the question whether
Earle was alive or dead in 1879. The whole case turned entirely
upon this question, but it was not left to the jury. The conviction
cannot therefore be sustained.
J.-The question turns entirely upon whether Ellen
Earle was alive or dead in 1879. The proof was on the one side
that she was alive in 1868, and must be presumed to be still living,
and, on the other side, that the prisoner presented himself to be
married in 1879, and must be taken to have represented himself
as being then free to marry. This raises a question of fact which
ought to have been left to the jury, but the Common Seijeant took
it upon himself to say that further proof was required. In this
he was wrong, and therefore the conviction must be quashed.
HAWKINS,

LopEs, J.-The only question upon which this case turns is
whether Ellen Earle was alive in 1879. This is clearly a question
of fact for the jury, and should have been left to them.
BowEN, J.-I

am of the same opinion.

That the burden of proof, in trials for
bigamy, is on the government to establish that there was once another wife,
and that she was living when the second
marriage ceremony took place, is elementary law: Regina v. Lumley, Law

Conviction quashed.

Rep., I C. C. R. 196; Squire v. T7,e
And that this
State, 46 Ind. 459.
proposition involves the necessity of
proving the prior marriage a legal one,
is equally clear. It must have been a
marriage dejure as well as defacto. If
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the first marriage was absolutely void,
the second is not illegal: Rex v. Butler,
R. & R. 61 ; People v. Lambert, 5 Mich.
349 : State v. Hodgskins, 19 Ae. 155 ;
Oneale v. Commonwealth, 17 Gratt. 582;
Shafher v. The State, 20 Ohio I ; State
v. Horn, 43Vt. 20. So thatifat the time
of the alleged prior marriage a still earlier
lawful wife was living, the second could
not have been legal, and therefore an
indictment for the third marriage alleging the second wife to be the prior lawful wife, cannot be sustained; although,
of course, it might have been, had it alleged the first wife to be still living.
As one step, therefore, in proving the
second marriage lawful in such cases, is
to prove the first wife not living when it
took place, the burden of proving that
fact also, must be upon the government ;
and when it is shown that she was living
shortly before the second marriage ceremony was performed, the question becomes one of the ordinary presumption
of the duration and continuance of
human life. And clearly this is too well
settled to be open to discussion. Like
other continuing facts, being once shown
to exist, the presumption is-a presumption of fact-that it continues to exist,
unless some evidence is offered to the
contrary. And, therefore, in ordinary
cases of only two marriages where the
first marriage was clearly legal, and the
first wife was shown to be living at a
stated time, the presumption of the continuance of her life would be sufficient
prima facie proof of that fact, at the
time of the second marriage, except for
a counter presumption, viz. : of innocence ; which has been thought to neutralize the presumption of duration of
life, and so to require that some evidence
be offered in such cases to show that the
first wile was living: Rex v. Twyning,
2 B. & Ald. 386 ; Greensborough v.
Underhill, 12 Vt. 604 ; Kdly v. Drew,
12 Allen 110.
The fundamental error in the trial
Delow in WilIshire's Case-so common
VOL. XXIX=-91

in criminal cases-was the ruling that
the burden of proof was on the prisoner
at all. For so long as the issue is
merely guilty or not guilty, the burden
of proof-in the proper sense of the
phrase-is never on the prisoner. The
plea of not guilty itself denies and puts
in issue every material fact and circumstance necessary to constitute guilt.
These facts may be simple or complex,
may relate to the present, the past, or
the future, may be easy or difficult of
proof; but that does not change the burden of proof and cast it on the defendant to prove his innocence-or, in other
words, to prove the non-existence of the
fact, the existence of which is absolutely
necessary in order to constitute guilt.
So long as the defence is never guilty,
the burden of proving guilt is, and must
be, always and constantly on the government, and never shifts.
A man is indicted for an assault and
battery ; his excuse is that he gave the
blow in self-defence ; in other words,
that although he used violence, it was
not guilty violence. Clearly the burden
of proving that it was not in self-defence, or, in other words, that it was
guilty violence, is, at the first and to the
end remains, on the government; and
proof of the blow given by the defendant does not shift the burden on him to
show affirmatively that he was acting in
self-defence. And, therefore, if the
jury, upon the whole evidence in the
case, have reasonable doubts upon toe
point, they cannot properly convict:
Commonwealth v. McKie, I Gray 61 ;
United States v. Lunt, 1 Sprague's Dec.
311 ; The Peoplev. Schryver, 42 N. Y.
I; Tweedy v. The State, 5 Iowa 434;
State v. Porter, 34 Id. 131 ; Kingen v.
The State, 45 Ind. 518. So where the
defence is that the blow was accidental
and not intentional, the burden of proof
is to the end on the government to show
that it was wilful :: United States v. McClare, 7 Boston Law IRep. (N. S.) 439
(1854).
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If the defence be an alibi,
is the burden on the defendant, as some say, to
establish his absence, or on the government to prove his presence? Clearly
the latter ; notwithstanding the ruling
of some judges at nisi prins to the contrary. Consequently, if the jury have
reasonable doubts of the defendant's
presence, they cannot convict: Commonwealth v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451; The
State v. Waterman, I Nev. 543; Turner
v. The Commonwealth, 86 Penn. St. 54;
Toler v. The State, 16 Ohio St. 583i
Chappel v. The State, 7 Coldw. 92;
State v. Jsey, 64 N. C. 56; Adams v.
The State, 42 Ind. 373.
If this be so as to overt acts, is it the
less so as to mental condition, intention,
knowledge, &c, when that is necessary
to constitute the crime charged ? Could
any one doubt that in an indictment lbr
passing counterfeit money, or for reeiving stolen goods, the burden of proving
the guilty knowledge is and continues to
be on the government throughout, and
never shifts upon the defendant to disprove it? Or on an indictment for an
assault "with intent to kill," is not the
burden equally (in order to convict of
the whole charge) on the government to
prove affirmatively and beyond a reasonable doubt the particular intent alleged ?
And suppose the defence isinsanity; or,
in other words, a denial of sanity ; is
not the burden logically upon the government to prove the sanity? And if
the jury doubt on that point, how can
:hey properly convict? Does not the
plea of "not guilty" deny and put in
issue the mental capacity to be guilty, as
well as the overt act alleged, and must
not the prosecution prove the one as well
as the other ? Is not the one as essential
an element or ingredient of the crime
as the other ? It certainly seems so, and
a large class of well-considered cases
have not hesitated to declare such to be
the only sound, safe and logical rule.
And therefore a reasonable doubt as to
-sanity must result in acquittal. See

The People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58 ;
The People v. Garbutt, 17 Mid. 9;
State v. Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224; Bradley v. The State, 31 Ind. 492 ; Brotherton v. The People, 75 N. Y. 162; 11opps
v. The People, 31 Ill. 385 ; Ogletree v.
The State, 28 Ala. 701 ; State v. Crawford,*11 Kans. 32 ; Smith T. The C'mmonwealth, I Duvall 224, and many
other cases. It cannot be denied, however, that in this particular defence,
many courts have taken a different view,
holding the burden of proving insanity
to be on the defendant, some requiring
more, and some less degrees of positive
proof. The chief argument being,
shortly stated, that as every one is presumed to be sane, it is incumbent on any
one alleging his insanity to prove it; or,
in other words, that the existence of a
presumption in favor of the government
as to any particular fact, changes the
burden of proof, and compels the defendant to prove affirmatively the opposite.
But is that true as to other presumptions
equally well established as the presumption of sanity? Every woman is presumed to be chaste, but when the question
of a particular woman's chastity is involved, the burden of proving it is on
the government alleging it, and does not
shift upon the defendant to prove her
unchastity: West v. State, 1 Wis. 209 ;
Commonwealth v. Whittaker, 130 Mass.
12 Reporter 16. The possession of personal property, recently stolen, creates
a presumption that the possessor stole it ;
but the burden of proof is not thereby
shifted upon him to prove that he did
not. See State v. Merrc~k, 19 Me. 398;
Jones v. The People, 12 Ill. 259. The
fabrication of evidence, a flight, or an
attempt to escape, raises a presumption
of guilt, but no one supposes that the
burden of proof is thereby shifted upon
the defendant to prove his innocence.
This would be giving undue weight to a
presumption. A presumption that a certain fact exists is only one means of
proving it-one piece of evidence-one
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inanimate witness, so to speak, testifyingthat these things are so. But if the
positive testimony of one living witness
to a defendant's guilt-one who actually
saw him commit the act-does not shift
the burden on him of proving his innocence, as no one pretends, how can the existence of a mere presumption on the same
side have more efftct. The presumption
of innocence-always innocence--certainly ought to have as much effect as
any presumption against the prisoner.
So long as a defence to a criminal
prosecution rests upon a denial of the
corpus delicti, or of any essential element
of fact or intention necessary to constitute the crime, so long the burden never
shifts upon the defendant. It is only
when he sets up some defence of confession and avoidance-like a former conviction for instance--that the burden
of proof is on him. But the defence of
insanity is not one of confession and
avoidance; it is one of denial, wholly
of denial. He denies his sanity; sanity
is necessary to constitute crime, and a
denial of sanity denies the original commission of the offence; not the act, but
the guilty act; and, therefore, so long
as the jury have a reasonable doubt of
the defendant's sanity, whether founded
wholly on the government's testimony,
or on that of the defendant, or partly on
both, so long they cannot properly convict ; and in that sense, the burden of
proving sanity is throughout upon the
prosecution, and never shifts. A verdict would hardly be sustained which
said, "We find the defendant guilty of
the murder, but have reasonable doubts

whether he was at the time sane or insane."
The error in the opposite view obviously arises from confounding the
phrase, "burden of proof," with a prima
fade case, on the weight and force of
the evidence. That may shift, from
time to time, from the one side to the
other, in the progress of the trial. The
presumption that all men are sane, undoubtedly constitutes a prima face case
that the particular defendant on trial
was sane, sufficient to justify a conviction, unless some doubt be created by the
evidence itself from one side or the
other. That presumption may, for the
time being, and in the first instance,
satisfy and fulfil the burden of proof,
but it does not change it. See Commonwealth v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 373; State
v. fye, 26 Me. 312 ; Ogletree v. 2The
State, 28 Ala. 693; Chaffee v. United
States, 18 Wall. 516. It may properly
call upon and require some evidence to
countervail it, and in the absence of
such, it may be and is sufficient to justify a conviction; but if, after giving
due weight to this presumption, and to
all the other evidence offered by the
government in favor of sanity, the jury
still have reasonable doubts of the sanity,
the burden of proof has not been sustained, and they cannot convict. The
difference of views on this particular
point may be in part owing to a difference in the meaning given to the term
"burden of proof," the cause, perhaps,
of some theological as well as legal disagreements in the world.
EDMUND H. BENNETT.

